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Voting advice applications (VAAs) are interactive online tools designed to assist voters by
improving the basis on which they decide how to vote. Current VAAs typically aim to do so
by matching users’ policy-preferences with the positions of parties or candidates. But this
‘matching model’ depends crucially on implicit, contestable presuppositions about the
proper functioning of the electoral process and about the forms of competence required for
good citizenshipdpresuppositions associated with the social choice conception of de-
mocracy. This paper aims to make those presuppositions explicit and to contrast themwith
two possible alternative perspectives on VAAs, associated with deliberative and agonistic
conceptions of democracy and citizenship.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction other important concerns unaddressed. As interventions inDebates over democracy are frequently motivated by
concerns about low levels of voter competence (Delli
Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Friedman, 2007; Caplan, 2008;
Brennan, 2011). One recent response to this concern has
been the development of ‘Voting Advice Applications’
(VAAs). These interactive online tools are designed to assist
voters by improving the basis on which they decide how to
vote. Due to the growing number, popularity, and inﬂuence
of VAAs (Garzia, 2010), they are now attracting sustained
attention from political scientists.
For the most part, however, researchers have focused
either on the extent to which VAAs inﬂuence voting
behaviour and election outcomes or on issues of method-
ology and measurement (see the articles in this symposium,
as well as Garzia and Marschall, 2012; Garzia and Marschall,
2014). This focus on technical issues, we believe, has leftossen), j.h.anderson@
ier Ltd. This is an open accelectoral politics, VAAs can also be assessed from the
perspective of how well they perform their function, and
that requires making clear what their function is supposed
to be. Hence our guiding question here: ‘What’s the point of
VAAs?’ As we shall argue, VAAs are built on conceptual,
normative and empirical presuppositions about democracy
and citizenship, especially about the ways inwhich electoral
practices currently fail to live up to their democratic po-
tential and voters currently fall short of making well-
considered decisions. As a result, claims about how VAAs
ought to be designed can never be adequately defended on
the basis of technical or methodological considerations
alone. Rather, justifying a VAA requires articulating and
defending these presuppositions about democracy and
citizenship.
Once questions are raised as towhatmakes a democracy
function ‘well’ or what qualities citizens must have to be
‘competent,’ it turns out that there are many more possible
approaches than the current crop of VAAswould suggest. In
particular, our central claimwill be that the VAAs currently
on offer are premised on one speciﬁc, disputed under-
standing of democracy and citizenship. In brief, theess article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
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gating the policy-preferences of voters and that strength-
ening democracy is a matter of ensuring that the support
for parties (expressed in votes) more accurately reﬂects the
existing preferences of voters. This ﬁts well with the
normative conception of democracy expounded by social
choice theorists, but that view of democracy is contested.
Defenders of deliberative democracy argue that the dem-
ocratic process is largely about the on-going revision of
political views rather than the aggregation of given pref-
erences. And advocates of contestatory or agonistic models
of democracy and citizenship emphasize the political task
of seeing beyond the current political landscape rather than
accepting it as a given. Our aim here is to show both that a
social choice model of electoral politics is implicit in the
current design of matching VAAs (even if not in the explicit
statements of their designers) and that, if one were to
endorse a deliberative or agonistic conception of de-
mocracy and citizenship, VAAs would have to be signiﬁ-
cantly transformed if they were to serve those purposes.
To make our case, we proceed in three steps. In the next
section, we situate the discussion about VAAs within a
broad concern with citizen competence. Then, in Section 3,
we identify the predominant ‘matching’ model of VAA-
design and the corresponding ‘social choice’ conception
of electoral politics and citizen competence. In a third step,
we discuss two alternative conceptions of electoral politics
and citizen competence – ‘deliberative democracy’ (Section
4) and ‘agonistic politics’ (Section 5) – and sketch the ways
in which VAAs would have to be (and are being) trans-
formed to realize these aims rather than the aims driving
current ‘matching’ models.
Posing these questions unavoidably shifts the discussion
from methodological issues to issues of political philosophy
and democratic theory, where questions have a normative-
evaluative, political, and contested character. Attending to
these issues is not, however, amatter of injecting politics and
values into a neutral domain. It is rather a matter of bringing
to the surface thenormative commitments thatalready frame
the design of VAAs. By identifying the guiding assumptions
behind existing VAAs and highlighting their contingent and
disputable status, we hope to broaden the debate over what
forms of digitally mediated voting assistance might be
possible and appropriate. For however much easier it might
be to implement matching VAAs, the fact that they are pre-
mised on a contested understanding of good citizenship and
democratic politics raises concerns about the dominance of
the matching model in current VAA-design. The point of this
essay, then, is not to defend any particular conception of
democracy, nor to provide a blueprint for new voting advice
applications, but to provide a frame of reference for further
debate by making explicit the contestable commitments
undertaken in the design-choices of different VAAs.
2. The problem of citizen competence
In general, voting advice applications can be deﬁned as
interactive online tools that are designed to assist voters by
improving the basis on which they decide how to vote. As
such, VAAs are intended as means of addressing one of the
oldest and must tenacious worries about democracy,namely, that citizens turn out to be poorly informed, easily
swayed, highly irrational, etc. Political thinkers from Plato,
Cicero, and Schumpeter to the present day (e.g. Caplan,
2008; Friedman, 2007) have seen citizen incompetence as
an unavoidable reality to which political systems must
respond, typically by strengthening the role of experts and
elites. Others, from J. S. Mill and John Dewey to present-day
advocates of civic education (Barber, 1994; Gutmann and
Thompson, 1996; or the United Nations Development
Program http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/
ourwork/democraticgovernance/ (Last accessed July 4,
2013)), keen to avoid this elitism and committed to over-
coming citizen apathy and ignorance, call for programs that
will make citizens more engaged and better informed. Part
of what makes VAAs so interesting is that they represent a
response that is arguably more feasible, convenient, and
effective thanwholesale programs in voter educationwhile
still being inclusively democratic.
There is an enormous literature on the precise nature
and extent of voter competence in various countries, and
we do not wish to take a position on the extent of voter
incompetence. But few would deny that there is room for
improvement. Recent empirical work in behavioural eco-
nomics, political psychology, and neuroscience is further
highlighting how predictably irrational humans are in
making choices (Kahneman, 2011), and how easily voters
can be misled intentionally and unintentionally (Caplan,
2008; Kelly, 2012). In light of this research, traditional ef-
forts to increase voter competence by providing themwith
more information may even exacerbate the problem by
generating further cognitive overload. In addition, as voters
have shifted away from voting on the basis of party loyalty
and demographic afﬁliation, they lose one of the primary
time-saving strategies for ﬁguring out how to vote (Dalton,
2002). In short, the growing complexity of electoral politics
overtaxes citizens’ already limited ability to make good
decisions about how to vote.
It is clear that many designers of VAAs take their pri-
marily task to be one of raising citizen competence. The
German ‘Wahl-O-Mat,’ for instance, aims to overcome voter
apathy and increase voter turnout by reducing the
perceived difﬁculty of making a choice (Marschall and
Schmidt, 2010). The Dutch ‘StemWijzer’ and Belgian ‘Do
the Vote Test,’ similarly, present themselves as increasing
voters’ knowledge of the parties’ positions on the issues, so
that users vote based on ‘substance,’ rather than the dis-
tracting candidate images and soundbites on which the
media (and hence the easily inﬂuenced public) tend to
focus (de Graaf, 2010; Nuytemans et al., 2010). The makers
of the ‘Kieskompas’ [Vote Compass Inc.] articulate yet
another version of the problem of citizen competence:
‘Members of the general public ﬁnd themselves con-
fronted with increasingly complex choices in several
walks of life. It is not always clear which choice ﬁts best
with their own preferences. Kieskompas seeks to help
peoplemakemorebetter-informed [sic] choices. Based on
scientiﬁcally approved methods, Kieskompas develops
web applications in order to make choices more
straightforward andmore transparent, both to voters and
consumers.’ (http://www.kieskompas.nl, versionof2011).
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VAAs – their ‘point’ – is to efﬁciently raise citizen compe-
tence, conveniently transforming users into better-
informed voters.1 That is to say, the ‘point’ of VAAs, at a
general level, is to address what may be called a democratic
‘competence gap’ between how engaged and knowledge-
able voters actually are and how engaged and knowl-
edgeable they would have to be for the democratic process
to function properly (Anderson, 2009). VAAs serve to close
this competence gap by leveraging voters’ performance,
much as a computerized expert system might assist an
architectural engineer in navigating complex decisions
about the construction of a building.
Clearly, however, there are a variety of ways of
conceptualizing what capacities citizens must have for a
‘properly functioning’ democracy. If one surveys the liter-
ature on voter ignorance and citizen incompetence, there is
wide consensus that themajority of citizens have low levels
of political knowledge, reason irrationally about the best
means to realize their ends, and exhibit widespread, pre-
dictable biases in their preferences for candidates, parties,
and standpoints (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Caplan,
2008; Brennan, 2011). Some of this is contested, of
course, in particular whether ignorance about matters of
geography or history is really such a threat to a well-
functioning democracy (Lupia, 2006). Indeed, part of
what a political theory needs to explain is why certain
forms of knowledge or other dimensions of citizen
competence are vitally important to a well-functioning
democracy. In the following sections, we will sketch three
competing perspectives on democracy and citizenship,
each of which casts the problem of citizen competence in a
different light. The key implication of this for our purposes
is that, depending on which perspective one takes, the
point of a VAA will be different, as will the desiderata for
designing a VAA.3. The matching VAA
By far the most prominent model of voting advice
application – represented by the Vote Compass and the
StemWijzer (as well as VAAs based on these, such as EU
Proﬁler and Wahl-O-Mat) – is concerned with match-
making between citizens and political parties (or candi-
dates), mapping the users’ preferences onto parties’ posi-
tions on the issues, thereby transforming users into well-
informed political shoppers. Uncommitted voters receive
guidance in ﬁnding the party that best ﬁts with their po-
litical preferences, as measured by the degree of agreement
with a set of statements concerning policy proposals drawn
from political party platforms. Different VAAs have
different ways of obtaining their information and different
ways of calculating and presenting the result. But the idea
is the same: the VAA aims to increase users’ ability to vote
well by informing them conveniently, efﬁciently, and1 This is not to deny that VAAs have other functions too. They also
provide entertainment value and introduce more accountability
regarding the genuine positions of political parties or candidates (see, for
instance, Marzuca et al., 2011).engagingly. It does so in three ways (Garzia, 2010): by
procuring information about the policy proposals of parties
involved in an election; by analysing the information in
terms of the ﬁt with the user’s own preferences; and by
assisting the user in applying this information, in light of an
easy-to-understand “results” page, in deciding how to
vote.2
Given this setup, the operating assumption of the
matching model is that voters lack sufﬁcient knowledge
about which electoral options ﬁt best with their prefer-
ences. They are poorly informed regarding the program-
matic differences between the parties on the issues at stake
in an election. At the same time, they are implicitly
assumed to be sufﬁciently competent to quickly express
cogent policy-preferences in response to appropriately
formulated issue-statements. So the primary competence
gap that matching VAAs are meant to address is a lack of
adequate knowledge of relevant party positions (whether
as a result of complexity or lack of time). By clarifying the ﬁt
between where they stand on the issues and where the
parties stand, matching VAA hope to also address the sense
of futility and alienation associated with being over-
whelmed by the complexity of the information or being
unable to resist candidates’ framing of the issues.
What broader picture of democracy and citizenship
does this presuppose? A good way to get at this is to ask:
What would we have to presuppose about the signiﬁcance
of the act of voting, in order for this construal of the
competence gap in electoral politics tomake sense? To start
with, by presenting the user with a kind of voting advice
based on answers to what boils down to a set of referenda
(a series of yes-no stances on concrete policy-issues), the
VAA treats given policy-preferences on a particular set of
issues as appropriate reasons onwhich to base one’s choice
at the ballot. In essence, this turns issue-voting into a
normative principle. What distinguishes a good voting
decision is that the selected party’s policy-positions accord
with one’s own policy-preferences. These preferences can
reﬂect interests or valuesdthe VAA is neutral about this.
What voters need to know is what options are on the table,
and this is the sense in which the VAA helps voters make
choices that are ‘better’. The signiﬁcance of the act of
voting, on this view, lies in expressing one’s policy prefer-
ences; the importance of doing this well lies in the prospect
that democracy offers of satisfying those preferences by
aggregating them at the collective level.
This view of the signiﬁcance of voting ﬁts closely with a
normative conception of democracy offered by social
choice theory. Democratic processes of decision-making,
on this view, are a means of aggregating the preferences
of individuals, in order to achieve outcomes that take the
preferences of each into account in a fair waydwhich is
complicated, of course, by the difﬁculties that afﬂict
decision-rules, as social choice theory has demonstrated
(Arrow, 1963; Downs, 1957; Riker, 1982). In short, a well-2 However much the developers of VAAs may insist that they are not
telling users who to vote for, the ‘results’ screen is presented as the
conclusion of a process, a process in which the inputs are the accurate
measurements of policy positions of both users and political parties.
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turns individual preferences into collective policies. The
good citizen (or, at least, the smart voter) is a savvy con-
sumer, who is well informed about the options on the
electoral menu, and therefore competent to choose a po-
litical party that matches his or her preferences.
What we get with the current VAAs then is a package of
elements that hang together in a way that is mutually
reinforcing: there is the design focus on matching voter
preferences with party or candidate positions; there is an
implicit diagnosis of citizens’ ignorance about party posi-
tions on current policy issues as a leading source of prob-
lems with the democratic process; and there is a
background assumption that the democratic process is
primarily about elections, understood as a means to
aggregate the given preferences of voters in the legislature.
This picture is further reﬂected in the tendency, among
proposals to revise VAAs, to focus on methodological im-
provements, tweaking the setup to get more accurate re-
sults by measuring users’ preferences in a valid and reliable
way, placing parties correctly, and providing sufﬁcient
policy detail.
Despite the dominance of this model in current VAAs,
however, many political theorists and citizens reject this
conception of the democratic process and of the corre-
sponding view of the competence gap in electoral politics.
In what follows, we consider two approaches that depart
from the matching model of VAAs and its associated con-
ceptions of democracy and citizenship. The ﬁrst empha-
sizes the importance of citizens’ rational, critical, and open
reﬂection on their current political preferences (or lack
thereof). We refer to this as the ‘deliberative’ approach,
owing to the emphasis on reasoning and the open dialogue
that often (though not necessarily) improves reasoning.
The other approach, which we label ‘contestatory,’ focuses
on challenging taken-for-granted depictions of the political
landscape and on helping voters to appreciate the
contentiousness of what gets presented as the relevant is-
sues in the election. Seen from either a deliberative or a
contestatory perspective, if the point of VAAs lies in
addressing democratic competence gaps, then the domi-
nant matching model of VAAs misses much of the point.
4. The deliberative approach to VAAs
Consider ﬁrst the possibility that it is not knowledge of
party-positions that citizens lack but rather well-considered
views about what the parties ought to be defending. The form
of citizen incompetence at stake, from this perspective,
concerns not a failure to know where the candidates stand
but a failure to think through what policies ought to be
adopted. More than voter ignorance about party-platforms,
it is actually a frustration with this broader lack of well-
considered preferences that ﬁgures prominently in com-
plaints about the state of the electorate (Fishkin, 2009;
Friedman, 2007; Caplan, 2008; Brennan, 2011). Yet this
conception of the competence gap between citizens’ ca-
pacities for self-government and what democracy pre-
supposes is fundamentally at odds with the social choice
model of democracy, which focuses on aggregating given
preferences.The idea that democratic politics might be about trans-
forming voters’ views does, however, ﬁt very well with other
approaches to democratic theory, particularly deliberative
democratic theory (e.g. Bohman and Rehg, 1997; Gutmann
and Thompson, 1996; Habermas, 1994; Goodin, 2008).
Here, the democratic ideal is not one of policies accurately
reﬂecting existing preferences but of citizens being able to
see themselves as co-authors of law and public policy in
virtue of the democratic procedures inwhich they (have the
possibility to) participate. The point of campaigns and
elections, on this view, is not merely to publicize the elec-
toral options and then aggregate the votes; the point is for
citizens to reﬂect critically and deliberate on the question of
how best to respond to various conﬂicts, issues of principle,
collective action problems, and so forth. According to the
deliberative model, then, a well-functioning democracy is
not just one in which ballots cast accurately match one’s
political preferences, but one in which the political in-
stitutions and culture facilitate the careful (re)consideration
of preferences, typically in response to new arguments and
information presented by others.
The citizen competence presupposed by deliberative
democratic theory has three key components. First, there is
an emphasis on being well informed about the issues on
whichone takes aposition; thus, onevotespoorly if onevotes
on the basis of political standpoints that rest on factual
mistakes, for example, about the economic, environmental,
social, or legal implications of a proposed policy. Second,
deliberatively competent citizens revise their political
standpointswhen they realize that their positions on various
issues or principles are inconsistent; in this sense, one votes
poorly when one is oblivious to tensions between one’s own
commitments to lowering taxes and maintaining current
levels of spending and keeping the budget balanced (Caplan,
2008). Finally, andmost distinctively, deliberative democrats
emphasize the importance of the genuinely public exchange
between citizens about how best to address pressing issues
and what policies can be justiﬁed. This emphasis on public
deliberation reﬂectsbothanempirical claimabout theway in
which appropriate dialogue can facilitate creative and
effective problem-solving (Goodin, 2008, chapter 5) and a
normative claim about collective will-formation through
rational deliberation being the only convincing way of
explaining how citizens can see themselves as engaged in
self-rule (Habermas, 2006; Estlund, 2008). For deliberative
democrats, the signiﬁcance of voting lies not in trying to
bring about outcomes that ﬁt one’s policy-preferences but in
jointly attempting to develop legislation that citizens can
view themselves as having co-authored.
Suppose one were convinced of some version of this
deliberative conception of citizen competence and demo-
cratic theory. What would one look for in a voting advice
application? Certainly not the matching model, which
treats as deﬁnitive users’ on-the-spot responses to issue-
statements. Rather, one would look for VAAs that
addressed the three key points mentioned above – VAAs
that assist citizens in becoming well informed about the
issues, in reﬂecting carefully on the implications of their
views on some issues for their views on others, and in
engaging in the sort of public deliberation that leads to
rational co-legislation.
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and the normative issues raised by talk of ‘rational’ delib-
eration are vexed. Still we would say that VAA-developers
committed to deliberative democracy can draw on a
range of promising ideas. With regard to improving the
extent to which users are well informed, one step in a
deliberative direction would involve integrating back-
ground information more prominently into existing VAAs,
many of which already offer links to additional information
about the issues but do little to encourage their use. Other
options include pop-up windows with additional infor-
mation in response to ‘no opinion’ response, or ‘gamiﬁca-
tion’ elements that encourage actively consulting various
sources of information. With regard to facilitating individ-
ual reﬂection on how one’s various policy preferences
cohere, VAAs could take a page from ‘expert systems’ in
artiﬁcial intelligence that require users’ decisions to jointly
satisfy certain criteria, such as budget constraints on the
allocation of public funds.3
One problemwith these sorts of interventions, however,
is that they are particularly liable to charges of bias
regarding what information is relevant and what argu-
ments are cogent. Thus deliberative democrats would
advocate more publicly discursive approaches in which
information, arguments, and challenges come from other
citizens. A distinctively deliberative VAAwould try to draw
on the potential of communicative interaction to improve
the quality of arguments and information. To accomplish
this, deliberative VAAs would have to become more inter-
active. One possibility here has recently been suggested by
‘YourView Australia’ in which users provide justiﬁcations
for their views and these justiﬁcations are promoted and
demoted via ‘credibility’ ratings from other users (van
Gelder, 2012), drawing on the approach developed by
TruthMapping.com, which highlights the importance of
ongoing, dynamic revisions to how statements, critiques,
and rebuttals are formulated within the tool. None of these
are panaceas. And to realize the potential of this technol-
ogy, designers of deliberative VAAs would have to facilitate,
structure, and prepare online exchanges so as to counter
well-known problems with group decision-making,
including the tendency toward conformity, polarization,
and ‘groupthink’ (Rosenberg, 2007; Fishkin, 2009), espe-
cially as they emerge in online forums (Davies and
Gangadharan, 2009; Kies, 2010).
What we hope to have shown here, however, is that
deliberative VAAs are both conceivable and markedly
different from the matching model with regard to what
they take the point of a VAA to be.5. The contestatory approach to VAAs
As we have seen, the deliberative model of the VAA
departs from the matching model by facilitating users’3 In 2012, the Dutch ProDemos launched an online tool (‘De Nationale
BegrotingsWijzer’) that allowed users to dynamically adjust where
governmental budget cuts would be made to achieve a constant overall
reduction (http://www.nationalebegrotingswijzer.nl; last accessed on
July 4, 2013).critical reﬂection on and transformation of their prefer-
ences, rather than approaching voters’ existing preferences
as ‘givens’. But there is another way in which the ‘given-
ness’ presupposed by the matching model (and to some
extent the deliberative model) can be challenged, namely,
with regard to the political landscape itself, understood as
comprising the issues that are seen as ‘relevant,’ the elec-
toral procedures that are deemed ‘appropriate,’ the parties
or candidates viewed as ‘legitimate candidates,’ and quite
generally, what counts as democratic politics. What we call
a ‘contestatory’ approach aims to challenge and reshape
users’ perception of the political landscape, rather than
helping users ﬁnd their place within the status quo.
Whereas the deliberative model departs from thematching
model in encouraging re-examination of voters’ political
tastes, the contestatory model focuses on assumptions
about what belongs on the menu.
To see why this might be deemed important, consider
that although well-constructed matching and deliberative
VAAs may be non-partisan, in the sense of not being biased
toward a particular political party, they are not thereby
wholly politically neutral. Even carefully designed VAAs
structure political information in a way that is informed by
the developers’ presuppositions (Fossen and Van den Brink,
unpublished work). Through the selection of issues and
parties or the spatial representation of the political land-
scape, for instance, VAAs help shape the agenda and rein-
force assumptions about what is at stake in the election
(Lefevere andWalgrave, present issue; Otjes and Louwerse,
present issue). Moreover, in focussing exclusively on voting
decisions, they endorse the legitimacy of the existing
electoral process (Anderson and Fossen, forthcoming). But
some citizens, and indeed some political theorists, take a
much more critical stance toward the current shape of the
electoral arena, or even toward the electoral process itself.
These critics emphasize, in particular, how a focus on
elections diverts attention away frommore radical forms of
participation. From this perspective, VAAs might seem to
be pointless, or worse. Yet democratic theories that
emphasize the ‘contestatory’ or ‘agonistic’ character of
democratic politics also provide an alternative vantage
point from which to develop VAAs, understood as interac-
tive online tools that are designed to assist voters by
improving the basis on which they decide how (and
perhaps whether) to vote.
The deﬁning characteristic of agonistic political theory
is its refusal to equate ‘democracy’ with existing electoral
practice, stressing instead democracy’s inherent openness
and the contestability of policy outcomes, institutions,
procedures, and articulations of democratic ideals (Mouffe,
2000; Honig, 2007; Tully, 2008; Fossen, 2008). Agonists
agree with deliberative democrats that given preferences
should not be treated as automatically authoritative. But
they are less sanguine than deliberative democrats about
the salutary potential of rational discussion, insisting that
individual preferences, public discourse, and political in-
stitutions are unavoidably the result of relations of power.
Failure to acknowledge this, they argue, can generate a
degree of tunnel vision, in which citizens are held captive
by a narrow picture of politics while alternate possibilities
are depoliticized and occluded from view (Owen, 2003;
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tence gap in electoral practice that generates concern stems
from a blindness to the contingent and framed character of
the political landscape as it is presented in the electoral
process (and in VAAs), as well as a lack of open-minded
imagination toward the possibilities for taking seriously
other ideas, institutions, practices, candidates, and issues.
Given howmatching VAAs reinforce prevailing views on
what ‘the key issues’ are and where people stand in ‘the
political landscape’, one would expect that defenders of a
contestatory model of politics would want little to do with
them. Interestingly, however, VAAs have also been used to
take a sceptical and sometimes even adversarial stance
toward mainstream public discourse, the party system, or
the electoral process. To give an example, in the run-up to
the 2006 Dutch parliamentary election the anarchist col-
lective Eurodusnie developed an alternative to the popular
StemWijzer, the ‘stemijzer’ (loosely translated, the ‘voting-
crowbar’). It aimed to make clear that behind the ‘parlia-
mentary horizon’ there is a ‘whole world of possible
standpoints and possibilities.’ As they stated: ‘Those who
ﬁll in traditional voting aides cannot even choose to leave
NATO or to have free public transport. In this way voting
aides contribute to a disturbing narrowing of public
discourse in the Netherlands’ (‘Eurodusnie presenteert
stemijzer’, 2006, our translation). This radical alternative
to mainstream VAAs was pitched at the level of the public
agenda. It sought to make room for options that were
excluded from the menu on offerdand in doing so it also
rendered visible some of the political choices inherent in
mainstream VAAs. In addition, by pitching itself as openly
and explicitly partisan, this ‘contestatory’ VAA was
designed to heighten voters’ awareness to theway inwhich
a biased depiction of the political landscape is often
shrouded in claims to neutrality – including the claims of
VAAs.
Some of the VAAs that spring up at election time – and
there were more than 30 during the Dutch 2012 elections –
are just for laughs. This has led some commentators to
dismiss non-mainstream VAAs as ‘toys’ (Nuytemans et al.,
2010, p. 140). And some of them do, indeed, have a rogue
character, openly ﬂaunting the careful methodological
strictures of mainstream VAAs: they use highly tendentious
formulations of statements, take up issues on which some
parties have no public position, and even encourage voters
to cast blank ballots. But to dismiss these VAAs as per-
verting the political process would be to overlook the
contribution theymake, in various ways, to helping citizens
appreciate the constructed and contingent character of the
political landscape. As political satire, some contestatory
‘VAAs’ call attention to the limits of electoral politics by
exaggerating and ridiculing certain of its characteristics, for
instance by emphasizing framing effects of campaigns and
even of VAAs.4 By focusing on interests of speciﬁc groups4 Examples include a VAA that presents pictures of party leaders and
asks users to evaluate their looks (http://kopsnel.nl (Last accessed July 4,
2013)); and one that gives voting advice based on primary responses to
images (for instance, responding to an image of a cow with either ‘Cute!
Let’s pet it’ or ‘Yummy! Let’s eat it’ (http://www.stomwijzer.nl (Last
accessed July 4, 2013)).(such as students or construction workers), some of these
VAAs serve to raise awareness of speciﬁc issues that are
marginalized in the public debate or absent from party
platforms. Alternatively, some contestatory VAAs may seek
not to put a particular issue on the political agenda but
rather to sensitize voters to what is at stake in an election
from the perspective of some particular identitydbased,
for instance, on religious afﬁliation or sexual orientation.
Even a result screen with ‘Don’t vote!’ can be seen as
contributing to citizen competence by drawing attention to
the lack of suitable candidates or highlighting alternative
modes of political activity besides voting.
In discussing the contestatory VAAs that have cropped
up spontaneously outside the mainstream of matching
VAAs, we have sought to highlight their diverse contribu-
tions to problematizing and even remedying citizens’
limited ability to look beyond conventional representations
of the political landscape. What we have not addressed
here are the important design questions involved in criti-
cally assessing these existing contestatory VAAs: one can
always ask, for example, whether VAAs avoid playing into
the hands of commercial interests, or howeffective they are
in making the political process more open, transparent, and
inclusive. What won’t be central to this assessment, how-
ever, is political neutrality. After all, part of their point is to
highlight the way in which VAAs – including contestatory
VAAs – never simply mirror the political landscape but
rather stage it according to politically contestable pre-
suppositions. From this perspective, the difference with the
matching model of the VAA, in particular, is not that con-
testatory VAAs take up a substantive position in the polit-
ical debate, but rather that they acknowledge that they do
this.
6. Conclusion
What one takes the point of VAAs to be clearly depends
on one’s conception of electoral politics and citizen
competence. Table 1 summarizes the three contrasting
perspectives on democratic practice, ideals of citizenship,
and the point of VAAs that we have discussed in this paper.
These are not, of course, the only options. The per-
spectives we have distinguished are meant to open a
debate rather than exhaust the possibilities. We challenge
both advocates and critics of VAAs to further elaborate and
reﬂect on these perspectives, and to specify more clearly
the competence gaps that their tools are meant to address.
It is important for developers to be clear about these pre-
suppositions because it will enable them to interpret,
assess, and defend future design-choices. Our primary
claim here is that an exclusive focus on amatchingmodel of
VAAs represents an undue narrowing of what the point of
VAAs can be – a narrowing that turns out to be premised on
a contested understanding of electoral democracy and good
citizenship. Once it is clear that the design of VAAs depends
not only on technical considerations but also on disputable
normative and political conceptions of democracy and
citizenship, a whole ﬁeld of debate opens up regarding
which approach to take.
One possible take on the different approaches that we
have outlined here would be to say that they are
Table 1
Three competing perspectives on democracy, citizenship, and the point of VAAs.
Matching VAA Deliberative VAA Contestatory VAA
Model of democracy Social choice democracy Deliberative democracy Agonistic democracy
Ideal of the citizen Citizen as savvy policy shopper Citizen as co-legislator Citizen as nonconformist
Competence gap Ignorance of party-positions Lack of well-considered
preferences on issues
Constricted perceptions of the political
landscape
Point of VAA To increase congruence between
voters’ preferences
and public policies
To facilitate rational
preference revision
To challenge the status quo and shift
the agenda
T. Fossen, J. Anderson / Electoral Studies 36 (2014) 244–251250complementary pieces of a comprehensive approach rather
than exclusive alternatives. Even if it is granted that
deliberative and contestatory approaches are right to
emphasize the importance of facilitating voters’ critical
reﬂection on their own preferences and on the predomi-
nant understandings of what ‘the issues’ are, it is still the
case that voters will need improved knowledge of parties’
positions to vote in an informed way. What is clear, how-
ever, is that it is a mistake to think that the matchingmodel
of VAAs, by itself, exhausts the possibilities for buttressing
citizen competence and strengthening democracy.
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